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Abstract
How could we understand the emotive power of national-populist discourses, indeed 
the calls to ‘make our country great again’? This paper directly tackles the recent 
Brexit discourse, within the broader context of rising national-populist sentiments. 
I offer a novel way of reading national-populism and the politics of subjectivity as 
I put forth a Lacanian-psychoanalytical framework, namely the void at the heart 
of national-populism narratives and thus their ability to produce and hail national-
populist subjectivities, particularly through ‘fantasy’, ‘jouissance’ and the prom-
ise to recapture loss. I suggest that national-populism discourses appeal emotively 
and thus interpellate, at least partially, their subjects by offering unity and a ‘full-
ness to come’, the promise of filling the void, the promise of full jouissance. Since 
such national closure and unity are unattainable national-populism discourses must 
appeal to lost golden eras of greatness and by rendering the Other the cause of their 
failure.
Keywords Nationalism · Populism · Brexit · Desire · Fantasy · The Other
1 Introduction
The puzzle of this paper was already emerging in the days and weeks before the 
2016 EU Referendum in the UK, pointing to an inverse correlation between ‘expert 
advice’ arguing against Brexit, on the one hand, and a strengthening of the Leave 
campaign, on the other hand. Consider, for instance, the warnings by Mark Carney, 
the Governor of the Bank of England, who stated that ‘A vote to leave the Euro-
pean Union could have material economic effects’ and might spark a recession [1]. 
The IMF chief, Christine Lagarde, also stated that leaving the EU would result in 
dire economic times for both the UK and the EU. The outcome, she said, would 
be somewhere between ‘pretty bad to very, very bad’ [2], with the UK Institute for 
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Fiscal Studies predicting a 2-year austerity ensuing a Brexit [3]. In fact, all major 
business and corporations, like Microsoft and HP, as well as key global actors, such 
as President Obama and the G7, advocated for the UK to remain in the EU. Very 
few ‘expert advice’ made the case for leave such as the Economist for Brexit  [4], 
whereas the clear majority opposed Brexit, mostly on economic grounds. In short 
and given the success of the Leave campaign in the referendum, the outcome seems 
clear: the more economic and ‘rational’ advice received against leaving the EU the 
stronger the Leave campaign became.
The puzzle gets further complicated with the permutations of the Brexit discourse 
in British society and political discourse over the last 3 years, and whilst taking into 
account the election of Donald Trump in November 2016 and the rise of national-
populist sentiments across Europe. Particularly is the call to reject ‘expert advice’ 
and ‘listen to our gut feeling’, thus invoking a sense of anti-intellectualism. We could 
clearly see this in various news items in newspapers and on the television whereby 
British citizens who support Brexit rejected the rational-choice and evidence-based 
arguments against Brexit, often simply saying: ‘I understand this very well but that’s 
how I feel’, therefore exhibiting a typical disavowal [5, p. 859].1 The continuous 
appeal, even if diminished by now, of the Brexit discourse seems, therefore, to be of 
an affective nature, enabled by a new politics of feeling and belonging [7, 8].
This paper thus asks: How could we account for the appeal of the Leave cam-
paign, their ability to galvanize public opinion despite such strong and nearly unani-
mous economic analyses arguing against Brexit? What is it in national-populist nar-
ratives that render them so effective and affective?
Nationalism and populism, particularly right-wing national-populism, are by 
now key phenomena under study and recent years have seen an increase of new 
approaches and theorisations [9–20]. The scholarship has traditionally ranged from 
‘demand’ arguments focusing on economic crises that lead to right-wing national-
populism to ‘supply’ theories focusing on the style and rhetoric of national-pop-
ulism [21–23], and/or defining populism as a ‘thin ideology’ [21, 24, 25]. In politi-
cal theory, debates often focus on the ambiguity of ‘The People’ and its complex 
relationship with democracy [26–28] and the potential threat national-populism 
poses to constitutional democracy [29–31]. With respect to Brexit, various studies 
have focused on the effects of globalisation and the ‘left-behind’ argument [32, 33], 
whereas others have critiqued this pointing to the racialisation in the Brexit appeal 
[34]. Nonetheless, and despite the rich scholarship on populism, nationalism and 
Brexit, very few studies have focused on the affective and structural dimension of 
national-populist discourses.2
This paper argues that the economy or rational cost–benefit calculations did not 
play an important part in the debate leading to the referendum (and indeed after-
wards). Rather, it has been the Brexit discourse which invoked a return to great-
ness, to a lost national-civilizational ‘golden era’ of British power whilst blaming 
immigration and the EU for standing in the way. This paper, therefore, argues for an 
1 See the recent psychoanalytic interrogation of Trump’s appeal in Andreescu [6].
2 Exceptions include [7, 8, 32, 35].
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analysis of national-populism at the formal-structural level, aiming to critically inter-
rogate the role of ‘feeling’ and the affective aspect of the Brexit discourse. To do so, 
the paper puts forth a psychoanalytical framework for the analysis of the Brexit dis-
course drawing on my psychoanalytical theorisation of nationalism [36–39] as well 
on recent psychoanalytic interventions on Brexit and national-populism [7, 32, 35]. 
More specifically, the paper suggests the following three interdependent apparatuses 
at play in national-populism narratives and in the Brexit narrative which lead to an 
effective and affective interpellation: fantasy, jouissance and loss (and the role desire 
plays in all three). Fantasy entails the Brexit narrative of promising closure and the 
fulfilment of the national-populist vision, but at the same time rendering a certain 
subject/object the cause of the Brexit failure [8]. The Brexit fantasy, as I previously 
argued [7], is a failure-based utopia that is able to produce and keep the national-
populist subjectivity at bay, suspended between the futurity of closure [40, 41] and 
that which is in its way, the immigrant and the EU. Jouissance (enjoyment) is key 
to understand the operations of fantasy and interpellation as it entails the affec-
tive power of populist-nationalism. Jouissance is thus the ‘powerful, bodily enjoy-
ment that drives human desire’ [42, p. 47]. To draw on Žižek, jouissance means the 
Freudian ‘beyond the pleasure principle’, namely the pleasure in pain [43]. The par-
adox is that jouissance (enjoyment) is impossible to fully obtain or preserve. It is the 
thing that we can merely feel temporarily and perhaps sigh: ‘yes, that’s it’. But at the 
same time, and perhaps because of its impossibility, we cannot let go of the desire to 
try to obtain full jouissance: to recapture loss. We are talking here, therefore, about 
bodily enjoyment that are ‘always-already lost’ [44, p. 261, 45]. This leads me to 
loss, namely the gap in the structure of national-populism discourse. The promise 
of fantasy and the recapturing of the lost enjoyment requires a narrative of loss, of 
fall and the promise to recapture it, to recoup jouissance. Loss, therefore, operates 
in the national-populist discourse retroactively, that is, produced through the fan-
tasmatic promise to recapture enjoyment and close the ontological (in)existence of 
the national-populist subject [39, 46]. But once produced through the fantasmatic 
narrative, it is assigned the cause of desire and the aim of the national-populist fan-
tasmatic narrative. This therefore means that loss and indeed all three apparatuses 
are built on failure and a tautological logic which, I argue, empowered the Brexit 
discourse and allowed it to produce and hail the national-populist subjectivity. This 
process of interpellation, therefore, is able to take place precisely because of the 
emptiness of the master signifier, the people/nation/we/sovereignty [47].
The paper has two main parts. The first part critically reviews some major 
approaches and theorisations of populism, and its relationship to nationalism and 
democracy. In this part I will show the need to theorise national-populism together 
and at the structural-ontological level, whilst accounting for its emotive aspect. The 
second part delineates the Lacanian-psychoanalytical architecture, whilst applying 
it to the Brexit discourse. This part is divided into three main themes that I unpack 
in the Brexit discourse focusing on the months leading to referendum vote in June 
2016 (with only a couple of references to the Brexit discourse afterwards). This part 
will explain the Lacanian lack at the objective and subjective levels, the power of 
fantasy, the jouissance that animates fantasy and the desire to recoup loss, all of 
which have been clearly present in the Brexit discourse. As I explain in this part, the 
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Lacanian theorisation of subjectivity and objectivity will help us explain how inter-
pellation operates in the Brexit discourse and in national-populist discourses, more 
broadly.
2  Part I: Populism, Nationalism and Democracy—A Critical 
Survey of the Literature and Towards a Lacanian Reading 
of National‑Populism
Recent decades have seen a paradigmatic shift in the study of populism and its rela-
tionship with nationalism and democracy. As Cas Mudde explains [21], the tradi-
tion in the post-WWII era was to render populism, particularly right-wing (extreme) 
national-populism, alien to Western democracies, suggesting, nonetheless, that a 
small percentage of such tendencies still existed in Western societies. This is often 
referred to as the ‘normal pathology thesis’, pointing to the conditions giving rise to 
national-populism on the right. As Mudde explains, such explanations focused on 
the ‘demand’ aspect of national-populism, whereas recent interventions have sought 
to challenge the ‘normal pathology thesis’, shifting the focus towards the ‘supply’ 
side explanations [21]. These more recent approaches focus on the style and rhetoric 
of national-populism, reading it as a ‘thin ideology’, that is, as a discrete ideology 
but one that is ‘unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology: it lacks the 
capacity to put forward a wide-ranging and coherent programme for the solution to 
crucial political questions’ [24, p. 95].
Focusing on the ‘supply-side’ of populism, Moffitt has demonstrated how the idea 
of crisis is intertwined with the rise of populism, particularly the more authoritarian 
version advocating the need for strong leadership [22, 23]. Moffitt argues that crises 
are not external stimuli causing the rise of populist leaders and parties, but a per-
formative aspect of populists’ rhetoric and style, as they ‘actively participate in the 
‘spectacularization of failure’ that underlies crisis, allowing them to pit ‘the people’ 
against a dangerous other’ [22, p. 190, 23].
In the more political theory orientated scholarship, Canovan’s work is key to 
understand the complexity and ambiguity of populism and its ‘nodal point’, ‘The 
People’ concept [26, 27]. To Canovan, ‘The People’ is not alien to the idea and ide-
als of democracy, it is not a pathological perversion. Rather, she argues, populism 
refers to the ‘redemptive side’ of democracy ‘accompanying [it] like a shadow’ [26, 
p. 16]. Moreover, in her historical account of ‘The People’ concept, Canovan dem-
onstrates the openness and ambiguity of the concept, as ‘The People’ may refer to 
‘people as sovereign’, ‘people as nation’ and the idea of the ‘common people’ vs. the 
elite [27, 28].
To Urbinaty [29–31], drawing on Canovan’s readings as well as taking a more 
critical view towards populism vis-à-vis democracy, populism is ‘parasitical on 
(because internal to) representative democracy, which is its true and radical target’ 
[29, p. 137]. Reflecting on changes in democratic governance as well as general-
ising from ‘historical experience’, Urbinati argues that populism does not enrich 
democracy [cf. 48] and can be defined as a movement that seeks to control the 
state and change its institutional character such that the elements and institutions 
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of constitutional democracy are eroded or even destroyed, including individual 
and minority rights, checks and balances and with these the changing nature of the 
media and the traditional party system.
Following the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and whilst 
drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s theorisation of populism and the ‘people’, recent inter-
ventions suggest a clear distinction between populism and nationalism. As De Cleen 
and Stavrakakis [49] argue, existing studies often take a Eurocentric approach to 
the study of populism and thus read it as part of nationalism, reducing it to extreme 
right-wing and racist movements/parties. This reductionism of populism to national-
ism leads, they argue, to the neglect of populist movements in Latin America that 
diverge from the typical European experience of xenophobic national-populism, and 
separating the two may have normative benefits by identifying populist politics as a 
vehicle to strengthen democracy rather than diminish it (cf. [10]). Moreover, they 
argue, reading populism through the nationalism/nationalistic fervour lens is also 
partially due to the nation-state framework, thus falling into the trap of ‘methodo-
logical nationalism’ and missing the chance to analyse contemporary populist move-
ments that are trans-national or even global in nature [49].
As such, these recent discourse analytical interventions offer an abstraction of 
populism and nationalism thus theorising both at the formal-structural level. The 
two are separate discourses each with its own ‘nodal point’, the Lacanian point de 
capiton, that arrest the flow of articulation, albeit only partially, in their respective 
discourses. Populism operates on a vertical axis (up/down) juxtaposing ‘the people’ 
with ‘the elite’ such that populist politics ‘claim to represent “the people” against 
an “elite” that frustrates their legitimate demands, and presents these demands as 
expressions of the will of “the people” [50, p. 110]. In populist discourses ‘the peo-
ple’ is the master signifier that bring various and even desperate groups together 
vis-à-vis the elite. This is the Laclauian chain of equivalence, namely the reduction 
of a given political setting to two major subject positions [51, p. 53–55, 113–118]. 
Conversely, nationalism operates on a horizontal axis, between ‘us and them’, with 
the ‘nation’ as its ‘nodal point’. To De Cleen and Stavrakakis the discursive struc-
ture of nationalism refers to a ‘limited and sovereign community that exists through 
time and is tied to a certain space, and that is constructed through an in/out opposi-
tion between the nation and its out-groups’ [50, p. 308].
This paper draws on De Cleen and Stavrakakis’ aim to theorise populism/nation-
alism at the formal-structural level and on the psychoanalytical underpinning of 
their discourse-orientated approach. Nonetheless, and as Brubaker recently argued, 
the distinction populism and nationalism does not seem to hold neither historically, 
nor in our contemporary political field [10]. More importantly, it seeks to offer a 
formal-structural account of the two phenomena whilst in effect offering a rather 
reductionist and essentialist definition of both populism and nationalism. As Cano-
van [27, 28] already demonstrated, ‘The People’ is an ambiguous concept that may 
have various significations and as such, indeed as a master signifier, appeal in vari-
ous contexts across time and space. We should also bear in mind that ‘The People’ 
operates on both the vertical and horizontal levels, and historically was invoked to 
both refer to the demos as the source of democratic legitimacy and as the majority 
‘under-dog’ exploited by the minority elite and having no political voice. According 
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to the Abbe Sieyes, a key figure in the French Revolution, the people and the nation 
is the same, that is, the clear majority who are in effect those who already run the 
every-day business of the nation but have no political voice as they are ruled by a 
small privileged elite [28, 37, 52].
Perhaps the problem lies in De Cleen and Stavrakakis’ attempt, to salvage pop-
ulism from the horrors of nationalism and legitimate the radical-democratic left of 
populist movements, especially in Latin and Central America, as well as recently 
in Europe [49]. Whilst partially drawing on Laclau’s discourse analytical theorisa-
tion as well as Stavrakakis’ previous theorisations of nationalism and affect [46, 51, 
53–56], I find De Cleen and Stavrakakis’ approach problematic because firstly, the 
affective dimension, indeed the jouissance which is key to interpellation (in Lacan-
ian psychoanalysis) is missing, and merely hinted at in their recent analyses of pop-
ulism and nationalism. Laclau’s later writings about ‘radical investment’ as well as 
Stavrakakis’ own work on nationalism and its affective and fantasmatic operations 
seem absent [46, 55–57]. Secondly and whilst the sliding relationship of signifier 
and signified are key to understanding the Lacanian theory of discourse, I would 
still argue against the conflation of the formal-ontological with the specific-ontic; 
between the structure of discourse and the cultural materials a discourse invokes. 
The point is not that the two are mutually exclusive as such, but that we should not 
use the cultural-ontic which we may favour normatively in order to create some form 
of theoretical separation at the ontological level, that is, between nationalism and 
populism. Consequently, as Žižek [58, pp. 280–284] argued, we cannot differentiate 
normatively so easily between nationalism and populism as the latter can be as dan-
gerous and exclusive, indeed oppressive as the former [see also Kaltwasser’s critique 
of Laclau and Mouffe’s work [59]. Moreover, deploying a logic of equivalence is not 
unique to a populist vertical schema, as populism can easily endorse an ‘us vs. them’ 
approach even if the us-them moves across and beyond national borders.
Returning to the scholarship on Brexit, Browning’s [32] recent linking of onto-
logical in/security, particularly as developed in international relations theory and 
critical security studies [35, 60–64], with a Lacanian-inspired framework is key to 
this paper. Browning maintains that the Brexit discourse was able to appeal to many 
in British society due to the fantasmatic nature of the Brexit promise, already oper-
ating on a fertile ground of discontent, grievance and a sense of being ‘left behind’. 
The Brexit discourse thus pulled people in by promising a return to a ‘lost home’,3 
an impossible promise which has by now created a heightened sense of anxiety and 
ontological insecurity [see also 12, 13, 35, 60–62, 64]. Indeed, Browning argues that 
given that Brexit has yet to be delivered, many Brexiteers are now further entrenched 
in their position, feeling their vote and win in the referendum had been stolen from 
them and that the political establishment had betrayed them, the ‘common people’.
This paper draws on Browning’s reading of Brexit as fantasy and its emotive 
aspect by arousing nostalgia and the promise of home. Nonetheless, and draw-
ing on my earlier analysis of the Brexit vote and the power of nationalism [7, 38, 
39], I argue that we need to further unpack the relationship between populism and 
3 For recent analyses of ‘home’ from an ontological security perspective see Mitzen [65]; Steele [66]; 
Manners [64].
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nationalism, both formally-structurally and in the specific case of Brexit. The exist-
ing pre-referendum ontological insecurities that Browning [32] refers to are also 
somewhat problematic, firstly because, as he identifies, they reproduce a racialised 
reading of Brexit (and national-populism) as if the Brexit vote was won by economi-
cally deprived white working class [34]. Secondly and whilst one could deploy the 
concept of ontological in/security through a Lacanian lens [35, 60–62], the idea that 
existing pre-referendum ontological insecurities and a sense of ‘strangers in our 
own home’, both articulated in the Brexit discourse as Browning argues, is some-
what antithetical to the Lacanian notion of fantasy [39, 67, 68]. This is because it 
is fantasy that produces the sense of loss and the impossible promise to refill that 
loss, fix enjoyment and a sense of identitarian closure. In other words, fantasy is 
not simply a narrative that seeks to address existing insecurities. Rather, it produces 
them whilst trying to offer the utopian solution in which insecurity is resolved whilst 
making sure it can never be delivered [67–69]. Finally, it is not clear from Brown-
ing’s analysis what exactly the Brexit fantasy promised that was able to appeal and 
indeed interpellate so many in British society. The answer to this lies in the affective 
power of national-populism and its promise of closure, something that is missing 
from Browning’s account and others who point to the performative aspect of pop-
ulism but neglect the persistent power of nationalism in contemporary societies [39].
3  Part II: Interpellating Britain—The Lacanian‑Psychoanalytical 
Architecture and the Void of National‑Populism
This part unpacks the operations of fantasy, jouissance and loss (including 
desire) in the Brexit discourse and how taken together they lead to an affective 
and effective interpellation. This means to psychoanalytically interrogate the 
form and power of the Brexit discourse and of national-populism, more gener-
ally [7, 37–39, 46, 47, 56]. The three apparatuses will be analytically explicated 
and applied to the Brexit discourse as I focus on three main themes in the Brexit 
campaign discourse, speeches by members of parliament, the Prime Minister and 
other Brexit supporters. The following is therefore structured according to three 
main themes: the first theme, Brexit Means Brexit, demonstrates how the empti-
ness of the Brexit discourse, that is, the Lacanian void at the heart of the subject 
and object of national-populism, enables affective hailing. The tautological logic 
of the Brexit discourse and statements such as Brexit means Brexit, should not 
simply be dismissed as irrational, but precisely because of their circular logic they 
offer a powerful sense of national-populist jouissance embroiled with affective 
belonging to an empty signifier. The second theme, Taking back Control/Break-
ing Point, demonstrates the operations of the Brexit fantasy as offering both the 
utopian future of closure and the obstacle to obtaining such closure. In this part 
I will show how disavowal was crucial in the particular case of Brexit, namely 
how the two campaigns supporting Brexit, the official Vote Leave and unofficial 
Leave.EU [70, 71], offered a way for people to disavow their racial worldview 
and their xenophobic sentiments [32]. The third theme, Standing on our own two 
Feet, entails the national-civilizational aspect of the Brexit discourse, in which 
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desire and loss play an important role, namely by invoking an imagined grandiose 
past, that of Empire colonialism and world dominance. The past in this theme is 
articulated as a way to celebrate national grandeur and of Britain’s ability to stand 
alone and succeed.
4  Brexit Means Brexit: Lack and Void in the Subject/Object 
of National‑Populism
This part puts forth a Lacanian psychoanalytical reading, thus theorising the 
effective and affective power of national-populist discourses and the need to 
interrogate processes of interpellation [46, 58, 72–74, pp. 78–79]. Our starting 
point is the Lacanian split subject, but as we shall see the split resides at both the 
subjective and objective levels. To Lacan, drawing on Freud’s theorisation of the 
splitting of the ego as a defence mechanism (Spaltung), the subject is split, it is 
a barred subject ($). As Fink [75, p. 45] argues this is a split ‘… between con-
sciousness and unconsciousness, between an ineluctably false sense of self and 
the automatic functioning of language (the signifying chain) in the unconscious-
ness’ (see also [76]). The Lacanian subject’s ontological status is one of void/
lack, that is, a lack of totality and sound sense of identity at the level of the indi-
vidual, which therefore leads to a continuous search of filling this void, of over-
coming the impossibility of identity [57, pp. 13–47, see also 77, pp. 334–337, 35, 
60–62, 78]. The subject is in search of an objective edifice to identify with and 
thus close the subjective lack and satisfy their desire. But the objective field is 
also lacking thus reintroducing the split at the subjective level. As Stavrakakais 
[57, p. 41] puts it:
If I need to identify with something it is not only because I don’t have a full 
identity in the first place, but also because all my attempts to acquire it by 
identifying with a supposedly full Other are failing.
We could say, therefore, that the social order, customs, rules and norms—the 
Lacanian Symbolic Order—offers both an edifice with which the subject may wish to 
identify, but at the same time it can never offer the full closure, the sense of fullness 
and security [38, 68, 69]. The Lacanian reading of the split subject is also key to our 
reading of what Freud [79] defines as Group Psychology, and national-populism in 
our case. This is because we are not talking here about the mere application of psy-
choanalysis to the collective/group level. Rather, it is the confluence and the void of 
both the subject and the object, their ontological lack, which therefore renders politi-
cal battles for meaning (and hegemony) an endless venture [53, 57, pp. 40–54].
The impossible yet desired sense to fill the gap at both levels, therefore, is what 
matters since it means that it is the emptiness of the master signifier that creates 
the subjective–objective relations. In other words, it is the split that constitutes 
the subject as an anxious subject continuously trying and failing at overcoming 
the split [80]. The Lacanian lack or split, therefore,
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… is not simply a property of the subject. It makes up its very being, its rela-
tionship to itself, to others, and to the world. This lack, in other words, is the 
condition of the sovereignty of the Lacanian subject [81, p. 659].
This suggests reading subjectivity as a paradoxical driving force in socio-political 
terms [77, 78], and especially in our reading of national-populism and national iden-
tity. This is because the subject’s ontological lack means that no fixed predicate can 
be attributed to national identities and indeed to the idea of the nation/state [39]. 
Rather, the process is one of continuous identification. But it is precisely because of 
this impossibility of identity that the quest for recovering the lost sense of being in 
the world gives rise to subjectivities. In other words, the ontological lack both sug-
gests no fixed identity and an endless struggle to cover the subject’s lack: It is that 
which ‘… defines the subject as such’ [76, p. 179]. Moreover, and as I explain below 
the Lacanian concept of fantasy, this void gives rise to our desire to cover this lack, 
to find the impossible identity, of both our subjectivity and the objective lack [57, 
pp. 40–54, 82].
From a Lacanian perspective, therefore, we cannot talk about subjects or identi-
ties as ‘…seat[s] that can hold any essential identity’ [77, p. 334]. There is no self 
or identity in the essentialist sense when we discuss national identities, which in an 
age of fear and ontological insecurity account for the fantasmatic promise of sta-
bility nationalism and religion offer [60]. Rather, what we do have is the endless 
attempt to eradicate the lack and impossibility of identity, of a clear seat or ego. As 
Stavrakakis [57, p. 29] clearly explains: ‘What we have then… is not identities but 
identification, a series of failed identifications or rather a play between identifica-
tion and its failure, a deeply political play.’ Both notions here, that is of ‘failure’ and 
the ‘political’, are crucial to reading national-populism psychoanalytically and I will 
turn to them now through the operations of interpellation in the Brexit narrative.
Interpellation as the production and hailing of subjectivities, the national-populist 
subjectivity, is able to take place precisely because of the emptiness of the master 
signifier, the people/nation/we/sovereignty. The void of objectivity and subjectivity 
is what renders the national-populism edifice so appealing as it offers a chain of 
signification without ever really arresting the flow of articulations. This is how we 
should read Thresa May’s famous statement in her bid to become Prime Minister in 
July 2016, a statement she repeated many times after: ‘Brexit means Brexit and we 
are going to make a success of it’. We should read this not so much as a speech act, 
as Adler-Nissan [83] recently argues, but as a tautological statement that according 
to Hegelian logic of tautology is ‘far from clarifying things, [it] tautology gives birth 
to the specter of some imponderable depth which escapes words; far from being an 
index of perfection, it hints at an obscene contingent underside’ [5, p. 370). The gap 
in the structure of Brexit, of British sovereignty, success and stand in the world is 
exactly its emptiness thus enabling interpellation.
This is similar to the ways in which the USA (and the UK) deployed the threat 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the weeks and months leading to the 
2003 Invasion of Iraq. As Oren and Solomon [84, p. 316] argue, the ways in which 
Iraq came to be securitised as an existential threat was due the performative rep-
etitions of WMD such that ‘[t]he ritualistic choral chanting of this phrase by the 
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administration, the media, and the public constructed… a heightened generalised 
sense of danger even as many of the chanters did not necessarily support the inva-
sion of Iraq.’
This tautological phrase, Brexit means Brexit, that was later repeated numerous 
times in the media, by politicians and in political discourse in general, also entailed 
a sense of collective jouissance, fuelling a fantasmatic vision of future British great-
ness. This jouissance directly links to the desire to cover the lack of the national-
populist edifice, namely the void at the heart of the UK as a nation/state and what it 
means to be British. And is not this the case of yet another of May’s famous state-
ment, on one of the UK warships on her way to Bahrain in early December 2016, 
proclaiming that a future Brexit deal is and will be British, again without any con-
tent, no predicates but an empty articulation of ‘we-ness’. As she puts it:
People talk about the sort of Brexit that there is going to be – is it hard or soft, 
is it grey or white. Actually we want a red, white and blue Brexit: that is the 
right Brexit for the UK, the right deal for the UK’ [85].
The interpellation that is at work again prescribes to the logic of tautological 
repetitions that seeks to cover the national-populist void with empty gestures that 
enable a sense of collective jouissance, as if the reference to the colours of the Brit-
ish flag, which in effect may be the colours of other countries like France or Rus-
sia, encapsulate the fantasy of Brexit, of a utopian future of greatness. It would 
be tempting to consider the British flag, or indeed any national flag, as ontic, as a 
specific symbol that clearly encapsulates the meaning of the national edifice. In the 
British case one could point to the history of Britain (i.e. the Royal proclamation of 
the union of Great Britain and Ireland) and the three national flags all interwoven 
into the Union Jack. Nonetheless, national flags, despite their perceived specificity, 
are able to operate and interpellate precisely because of their structural emptiness 
across different groups and no doubt over time. The British flag does not entail any 
specific vision as to the UK-EU relationship and it can be deployed to both justify 
Brexit and oppose it.
5  Taking Back Control/Breaking Point
The image of society and that of the national-populist edifice, therefore, is always 
in flux and ambivalent at its core. It is here that fantasy is key to understanding the 
impossible promise of national-populist unity and, equally important, the affective 
investment that the national-populist fantasy entails. Fantasy arises out of a need to 
cover for lack, the hole or gap in one’s sense of identity and indeed in the imaginary 
wholeness of society. Fantasy is thus a support of sorts for the incompleteness of 
social reality that is more real and less real to that of society, the nation, the state 
or any form of imagined collectivity, and that precisely because of this must aspire 
continuously to recapture its being/becoming in the world [39].
Fantasy thus always attempts to frame the ideal society in which we wish to live; 
it sets the criteria by which the ‘good life’ can be attained, as it constantly strives to 
cover the lack, the incompleteness and indeed void of and within society. As such, 
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fantasy constantly aspires to account for the unpredictability, indeed the contingent 
nature of social life by providing an ideal and reassuring blueprint for a fixed and 
structured world, a certain necessary utopia ([57, pp. 99–121], see also [86]), that 
is, the future promise of fulfilment in which fantasy is realized and enjoyment is 
attained, although a realization that can never be realised as I explain below. Fantasy, 
therefore, both renders a narrative of societal completeness and ensures such closure 
is never reached [38, 87–89, 69, 90]. Fantasies and here the fantasy of national unity 
embedded in and expressed through statehood, the fantasy of nation/state homoge-
neity so endemic to modernity/modernism [91, 36, 92–94], ‘… obfuscates the true 
horror of a situation: instead of a full rendering of the antagonisms which traverse 
our society, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic Whole, kept together 
by forces of solidarity and co-operation’ [68, p. 5; see also 68, 95, pp. 47–60].
The national-populist fantasy, moreover, should not be read as reality’s antonym. 
As Žižek [68, p. 57] suggests, ‘[i]n the opposition between dream and reality, fan-
tasy is on the side of reality…’. Ideas and conceptualisations of an imagined col-
lectivity should not be dismissed as such, as imagined, or merely institutionalised 
through practices, institutions and/or habits. Rather, the fantasy of national-populist 
unity is that which constructs and renders reality possible—a reality that is contin-
gent and in which society, the people, the nation, ‘we’ is anything but a homogene-
ous symbol [38]. In the Lacanian architecture of the three registers—The Real, the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary [96, 97, pp. 139–163]—fantasy is the narrative that 
enables us to escape the horror and trauma of the Real, as that which cannot be sym-
bolised, and offers instead a ‘smoother’ reality [98, pp. 1133–1136]. This is because 
‘fantasy is basically a scenario filling out the empty space of a fundamental impos-
sibility, a screen masking a void’ [82, p. 126, see also 40, pp. 19–20, 41, pp. 33–34, 
69]. To Zevnik [95, p. 629], drawing on the Lacanian concept of Che vuoi?, ‘fantasy 
secures and reinsures the subject of the necessity of its mandate’ by reassuring us 
with what the Other wants from us, what is expected from us, or what the Other 
desires (an ambiguous process that entails its own failure and anxiety as I explain 
below).
As Arfi [87] and Eberle [88, 89] clearly explain, fantasy both renders the nar-
rative of completeness possible and prevents it from obtaining full closure. It is 
here that I return to the importance of failure and the political in the analysis of the 
national-populist fantasy because as we learn from Lacan, fantasies always include 
their own failure, the explanation why the fantasmatic futurity [40, 41] has not yet 
been attained. As Glynos and Howarth [99, p. 147] put it:
Fantasy operates so as to conceal or close off the radical contingency of social 
relations. It does this through a fantasmatic narrative or logic that promises a 
fullness-to-come once a named or implied obstacle is overcome ... or which 
foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable.
Failure is therefore at the heart of the national-populist fantasy because it is the 
lack and void of national subjectivities, and the people concept nationalism always 
requires [26–28, 37, 100], that propels the fantasy of national unity, which in turn 
must explain and articulate its own impossibility: its inherent failure. This fail-
ure, or obstacle, nonetheless, is what constitutes subjectivity, the national-populist 
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subjectivity, since it is loss and alienation that make the ‘basic condition of the for-
mation of subjectivity and agency’ [77, p. 336].
We could approach this duality in the functioning of fantasies by distinguish-
ing between  fantasy1 and  fantasy2.  Fantasy1 is the alleged unifying narrative of the 
national story, the narrative that captures all potential antagonisms and contradic-
tions and clearly stipulates one’s national roots, one’s present importance in ‘work-
ing together’ and in setting one’s collective destiny.  Fantasy2, however, is the obsta-
cle, the Other whose existence and continuous meddling in ‘our’ affairs is the cause 
of ‘our’ inability to fulfil ‘our’ potential and to be finally a united nation, one people. 
As Žižek [5, pp. 685–686], see also [68] puts it:
Fantasy1 and  fantasy2 … are thus two sides of the same coin. Insofar as a com-
munity experiences its reality as regulated and structured by  fantasy1, it has to 
disavow its inherent impossibility, the antagonism at its very heart – and fan-
tasy2 gives body to this disavowal. In short, the success of  fantasy1 in main-
taining its hold depends on the effectiveness of  fantasy2.
Fantasies operate such that they offer ‘…. a fullness-to-come once a named or 
implied obstacle is overcome … or which foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves 
insurmountable [99, p. 147]. The two campaigns advocating Brexit, Vote Leave 
and Leave.EU, demonstrate the two sides of national-populist fantasies. On the one 
hand, the promise was one of a bright, hopeful and utopian future. A future of suc-
cess, greatness, and wealth in which the British people is its main source of legiti-
macy and its referent-object. At the same time, failing to leave the EU, would result 
in loss of money, control and descent into undemocratic rule by Brussels and grow-
ing immigration. The two aspects of an effective and affective fantasy,  fantasy1 as 
the utopian future and  fantasy2 as the obstacle, were present in the months leading to 
the Brexit vote in June 2016 and ever since, especially during the campaigns for the 
European parliamentary elections in May 2019.
The key slogan of Vote Leave (2016), the formal campaign to leave the EU, was 
‘Vote Leave, take back control’ [70], clearly sliding between the utopian future out-
side the EU and the catastrophe which is lurking behind the corner if the UK failed 
to vote leave during the referendum and deliver on the Brexit vote since. The web-
page, Why Vote Leave, on the online website of Vote Leave, gives the viewer two 
expandable tabs: one in light blue colours entitled ‘If we vote to leave the EU’, the 
other in red entitled ‘If we vote to stay in the EU’ [70]. What would happen…
If we vote to leave the EU,
Click to find out http://www.votel eavet akeco ntrol .org/why_vote_leave .html
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The first tab, as above, offers the viewer a utopian future of saving money that 
goes to the EU and can be spent at home on various public goods like the National 
Health Services, schools, housing and more. Moreover, the fantasy of British sov-
ereignty, control over borders and spending is represented in an imagery that taps 
into existing British culture and its symbolic order such as the NHS sign, Britain’s 
island status and geography and of course the British national flag. As such, the 
online campaign of Vote Leave is able to fantasmatically and emotively play into the 
national-populist imaginary.
The obstacle, or threat, is encapsulated in this promise and presented in the fol-
lowing tab entitled: If we vote to stay in the EU [70]. If we vote to stay in the EU, 
the campaign advises us, the EU will enlarge to include Serbia and Turkey, amongst 
other countries, thus bringing more pressure on the UK in terms of immigration, 
budget and curtailing UK’s ability to legislate its own laws. The obstacle is therefore 
loss of control, demographic change and loss of Britishness (i.e. loss of Whiteness), 
and a society descending into chaos.
If we vote to stay in the EU,
Click to find out http://www.votel eavet akeco ntrol .org/why_vote_leave .html
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The informal, and often more blunt campaign to leave the EU, LEAVE.EU, 
offered an even stronger aspect of  fantasy2, the obstacle or threat to come if we 
fail to obtain  fantasy1. A good example is the infamous campaign ad sponsored by 
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LEAVE.EU and the UKIP Party, then led by Nigel Farage, which appeared through-
out the country just weeks before the referendum vote. The ad made clear references 
to the flow of refugees throughout Europe in 2015, mostly from war-torn Syria and 
Afghanistan, as well as using an imagery that is strikingly similar to Nazi propa-
ganda, thus clearly invoking a racial and xenophobic worldview, warning people 
against staying in the EU, which will lead to ‘swarms of migrants into UK cities and 
towns’ [101].
The relationship between the formal and supposedly more benign and politically 
correct Vote Leave campaign and the informal campaign led by the UKIP Party 
and sponsored by Aaron Banks, also points to the disavowal in play in the Brexit 
narrative. As Wincott [33] and Browning [32] identify, the more racist and blunt 
Breaking Point poster ad and overall the Leave.EU campaign, which was criticised 
by Vote Leave, offered many voters a way to whitewash and disavow their racist sen-
timents. Brexit voters could thus criticise the Leave.EU campaign and its racist tone, 
whilst at the same time argue for Brexit on presumably neutral and legal-economic 
grounds, that is, invoking the empty signifier of ‘us’ and ‘our’ so as to legitimate a 
break from the EU in order to control ‘our’ borders make ‘our’ own laws and strik-
ing deals with ‘our’ allies.
Nonetheless, the disavowal in the Brexit did not only manifest itself by the rejec-
tion of the more overtly racist Brexit message of UKIP and Leave.EU. In fact, the 
disavowal (Verleugnung) operated by clearly and openly discussing Brexit’s rac-
ist/xenophobic sentiments whilst denying it at the same time. As Žižek [5, p. 859] 
explains, in disavowal the issue at hand is openly discussed and addressed but ‘its 
symbolic impact is suspended, it is not really integrated into the subject’s symbolic 
universe’. The typical disavowal was therefore along the lines of ‘I know very well 
that Brexit may have racist undertones, but nonetheless I support it because I want 
control over our borders’. An example of this disavowal was clearly articulated by 
Julia Hartley-Brewer, a radio presenter and pro-Brexit campaigner, writing in the 
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Telegraph just a day before the referendum. In it she offers reassurance to prospec-
tive leave voters and talks about ‘immigration’ and ‘pressure’ on ‘our’ NHS and 
public services:
And perhaps you are afraid of being called a xenophobe or a racist or a Little 
Englander if you want to vote to control our borders? Well, rest assured that 
the many millions of people who are voting Leave on 23 June are not nasty, 
bitter old racists who want to go back to the 1950s. This isn’t about closing 
our borders and turning our backs on the world… There is absolutely nothing 
racist or xenophobic about being concerned about the pressures on housing, 
schools, the NHS, our roads, public transport and community cohesion that 
years of mass uncontrolled immigration has brought [102].
6  Standing on Our Own Two Feet
Fantasies, however, are not merely discursive and objective fillings by which 
national-populist narratives are fixed and/or hegemonized. Focusing on national 
fantasies and narratives is not an analysis in the ‘… field of objective relations’ 
[55, p. 105]. Rather, fantasies are embroiled with jouissance, a libidinal and affec-
tive investment entailing bodily enjoyment that produces and interpellates popu-
lations [47]. The fantasmatic national-populist narrative always entails a plot in 
which enjoyment was lost, stolen and destroyed. These are the stories of national 
and civilizational golden-ages, heroic pasts or major defeats and catastrophes nar-
rating ‘our’ lost grandeur [46]. The promised jouissance is thus ‘always-already 
lost’ [44, p. 261] and is revived in the national utopia by the promise to recapture 
it, to reinstate it through the establishment of national sovereignty and by control-
ling (a specific) territory. The national-populist fantasy is thus an impossible-pos-
sibility that is nonetheless envisioned and as such is capable to hail populations 
precisely through its promise and the partial collective enjoyment it offers to its 
members. As Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras [46, p. 153] put it:
…the lost golden era of absolute enjoyment and the possibility of a return 
to this era is a chimera. However, the existence of this fantasy fosters the 
solidarity of the community, consolidates national identity, and animates 
national desire.
A good example of this affective call to restore Britain’s greatness and reignite 
a sense of national jouissance can be found in the words of Major-General Tim 
Cross from the Veterans for Britain campaign, making the case for Brexit in the 
Telegraph a month before the June referendum:
As the 21st century unfurls we can and should stand among the front rank of 
world powers, bowing to no one and displaying confidence in ourselves as a 
country unique among the brotherhood of nations [103].
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Equally key here are the various references to Britain’s history as a military and 
trading power, as the author of this op-ed, Major-General Tim Cross, clearly invoke 
Britain’s military fights against Nazism and against Argentina in 1982. Indeed, the 
two pictures that illustrate the piece are those of Winston Churchill with his typical 
victory sign and Margaret Thatcher in her visit to Port Stanley. As such, the piece 
clearly makes the case for rejecting ‘defeatism’ and asserting Britain’s strength as a 
unique power that does not require the European project:
Bloody minded, indeed arrogant, we stood firm under inspirational and vision-
ary leadership that made no apologies for what we stood for and what we were 
capable of achieving. Today Whitehall is stuffed full of senior politicians, civil 
servants and advisers who believe that Britain cannot survive unless we bury 
ourselves inside an amorphous mass of unelected bureaucrats. They have no 
pride in where we have come from as a nation and no clue as to what we can 
be in the future…Many of us are not prepared to accept this defeatism… [103].
What therefore seemed to have united the various voices calling to leave the 
EU—those of Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Iain Duncan Smith, Liam Fox (all then 
MPs from the Conservative Party) and Gisela Stuart (Labour MP and Chair of the 
Vote Leave) was the promise to be great again, independent, democratic and sover-
eign. As Liam Fox [104] suggested on the Andrew Marr Show on the BBC on 29 
May 2016:
I want to leave the European Union because I want control of our own law-
making. Sovereignty for me is key. I want control of our own money that we’re 
handing over at the moment to Brussels. And I want control over our own bor-
ders.
Returning briefly to lack as constitutive of subjectivity and identification dis-
cussed earlier, Solomon’s [105, p. 917] analysis of discourse, affect and jouissance 
is exceptionally useful here as it displays the ambiguous nature of fantasies and the 
jouissance they entail:
In pursuing a whole sense of ‘self’, the subject continually experiences both 
frustration and satisfaction – satisfaction in identifying itself with those valued 
signifiers of a culture that confer a sense of being and security (such as ‘patri-
otic’, ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘democracy’, etc.) and frustration in never being able 
to fully identify with the promise of wholeness and stability that such privi-
leged signifiers seem to offer.
The promise of jouissance is thus ambiguous and fantasmatic in the sense 
that it only offers limited experiences of belonging rendered meaningful through 
partial-enjoyment. This is vital to understanding the emotive hailing power of 
national-populist narratives and their promise of closure as they strive to eradi-
cate the gap, the lack in the national-populist subjectivity, by offering partial 
modes of belonging, of limited identification with the Lacanian objet petit a as 
the object-cause of desire [87, pp. 432–437, 44, pp. 262–263, 58, but see 54, pp. 
112–115).
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This is how law and society’s demands operate. That is, by imposing limitations 
and prohibitions on the subject’s access to full jouissance such that ‘[O]ne no longer 
experiences pure desire; instead all cravings and ways of enjoyment are within the 
limits of society’ [78, p. 29]. At the same time, however, it is precisely the impossi-
bility of full jouissance and a satisfaction of desire that produces the barred subject, 
thus again demonstrating the chimera aspect of fantasy as conditions of possibility 
for partial enjoyment and the obstacle for why it is only partial [87, 106].
It is here that we see the importance of desire in the Lacanian architecture, and its 
complex relationship with lack, fantasy and enjoyment. First, as I explained above, 
desire arises from the basic void at the level of subjectivity, but it arises equally at 
the level of the objective, such as the lack in the national-populist edifice. In other 
words, desire is aimed not at satisfaction, say, of some particular need. Indeed, 
desires and needs are not identical, and this explains the consumerist and over-con-
sumption of the affluent West which does not need things but desires them nonethe-
less [98, p. 1122].
Desire, therefore, is aimed at recouping that which cannot be symbolised or 
named, the void/loss. This unnamed thing is the Freudian Das Ding and the Lacan-
ian objet petit a as the object-cause of desire [82, 69]. As such, desire has no object 
that ‘could satisfy it’ and we end-up with an endless movement ‘simply for the 
enjoyment (jouissance) of pursuing it’ [106, p. 5, 69, pp. 75–100, 95].
Second is the role fantasy plays as it ‘constitutes our desire, provides its coordi-
nates; that is, it literally ‘teaches us how to desire’ [107, p. 47]. Kapoor [98, 108], for 
instance, demonstrates the relationship between fantasy and desire in his analyses 
of development discourse that construes the Third World as poor and ‘backward’, 
thus de-historicising imperial legacies and avoiding the more profound problem of 
inequality. In other words, the fantasy of development ‘…is the mise-en-scène for 
desire: it helps make reality smooth, coherent and harmonious, protecting us from 
trauma or lack…’, thus reassuring us in the global north that the reason for ‘under-
developed’ states is because of ‘rogue civil servants, corrupt leaders, uneducated or 
irresponsible mothers, ‘ethnic’ or ‘traditional’ practices’ [98, p. 1134].
Returning to the ways in which fantasy ‘teaches us how to desire’ [107, p. 47] and 
the pursuit of enjoyment, the ways national-populist narratives of unity are struc-
tured are psychoanalytically telling. They often offer various such moments of par-
tial enjoyment and satisfaction as well as frustrations such as in the event of a crisis, 
war and/or national celebrations, parades and memorial days. The national edifice 
is able thus to produce and hail its national subjects through this partial experience 
of ‘we-ness’. But this is limited for any such moment of affective belonging ends 
with frustration, with a cry that this is not quite it, since enjoyment was experienced 
but very quickly lost again. Belonging was bodily performed but only to be shortly 
removed from the libidinal economy [44, p. 262]. As explained above, this is due to 
the subjectivity’s lack as the driving force of identification, but a lack that can never 
be rendered whole and as such includes the ambiguous or ‘amorphous’ quality of 
affect [90, pp. 44–51].
We can see these operations of jouissance, desire and fantasy in various 
speeches by prominent Brexiteers, again invoking Britain’s past as a global mil-
itary and trading power, its prestige as the oldest democracy, whilst rendering 
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Brussels and the European project a threat to Britain’s freedom, democracy and 
identity, amongst other things. Lord Nigel Lawson, former chancellor of the 
Exchequer in Thatcher’s government in the 1980s, offered a strong rebuttal of the 
EU and its curtailing powers over the UK before offering precisely this sense of 
national-civilizational jouissance, of being proud and ‘standing tall’:
Above all, we would become once again a self-governing democracy, with a 
genuinely global rather than a little European perspective. We would pros-
per, we would be free, and we would stand tall. That is what this referendum 
is all about [109].
The impossibility of the national fantasy and the jouissance that keeps the fan-
tasy going, indeed animating it [68, pp. 55–106], is directly linked to lack and 
the gap in the national existence, but this admission in ‘our’ lack, or the lack in 
the national signifying structure, is not recognized in the national edifice, for that 
would mean anxiety and paralysis. This is where we see again the affective and 
enjoyment-infused power of the national-populist fantasy, that is, by promising 
us  fantasy1 in which full unity is obtained, ‘the people’ are the true rulers and the 
ontological void is concealed. At the same time,  fantasy2 offers us an explanation 
for why we are not yet congruent and secured and thus how we slide between cov-
ering the lack and the impossibility of materialising  fantasy1.
What the national-populist edifice thus offers is a certain libidinal bribe and 
trade-off. Through the constitution of the national body and bodies, the national-
populist narrative interpellates populations—that is to say the national population 
introjects the symbolic order through myriad practices and performativities (e.g. 
national symbols, the flag, national holidays and commemorations)—whereas the 
lack and inability to fulfil the fantasy and obtain authentic and lasting enjoyment 
is projected onto the Other [47]. This Other now stands for difference, for our 
lack, and its existence is both a hindrance and a necessary explanation for why 
we have not yet managed to secure and obtain our national fantasy [87–89, 99, p. 
147, 95]. Why we cannot live freely and are still insecure. This demonstrates how 
national-populist fantasies both promise us the satisfaction of desire, the obtain-
ment of jouissance, security and fulfilment of our national aspirations, and at the 
same time making sure this promise is kept at bay, unrealized.
This way enjoyment is kept at a “healthy” distance, not too far but not too 
close either; close enough to support the appeal of an object of identifica-
tion but far enough from letting us entertain the vision of full satisfaction 
as an imminent possibility, something that would kill desire, induce anxiety 
and put identification processes in danger [46, p. 152].
It is here that we see the form and power of national-populist and civiliza-
tional discourses which invoke the heyday of strength, power and influence in the 
world and thus romanticise the past. A past, however, which had been lost, indeed 
stolen by someone, but which can be reclaimed in the nearby future [46].  It is 
no surprise, therefore, that Brexiteers had invoked Britain’s history, its days of 
Empire and its fight against Nazism and Communism in an attempt to tap into 
1 3
‘Making Our Country Great Again’: The Politics of Subjectivity…
the country’s collective memory and thus appeal to British population through an 
affective call to rally ‘round the flag’. Once we leave the EU, Brexiteers promised, 
we would be able to ‘stand on our own two feet’, recover a sense of national pride 
and obtain a global acknowledgement of Britain’s position in the world as a great 
power. As Julia Hartley-Brewer, a radio presenter and pro-Brexit campaigner, put 
it just a day before the referendum:
So trust Britain to be able to stand on its own two feet in the world. Trust the 
British people to know how best to govern our own country. But most of all, 
trust yourself to take back control, and vote for Britain to leave the EU [102].
Or, in the words of Iain Duncan Smith (a conservative MP and key figure in the 
Vote Leave campaign):
Britain is a phenomenal country, the fifth largest economy in the world, it has 
stood alone and fought for freedom, it has traded, it has been a global trader, it 
can yet again be a global trader [110].
7  Conclusions
This paper analysed the Brexit discourse through a Lacanian psychoanalytical 
framework, focusing on the formal-ontological aspect of the Brexit discourse and 
national-populism, more broadly. The paper began with a clear puzzle that was evi-
dent already in the days and weeks leading to the Referendum in June 2016, namely 
that economic and cost–benefit calculations did not play a major role. Instead, I 
argued, three key apparatuses were key to the affective success of the Brexit cam-
paign: fantasy, Jouissance, and loss (including the importance of desire and how 
taken together they brought about successful interpellation). Fantasy refers to the 
ways in which the Brexit narrative entailed both the utopian futurity of closure, 
security and independence whilst blaming the inability to achieve all those because 
of the EU, Brussels and immigration. Jouissance refers to the partial bodily enjoy-
ment that was invoked time and time again in the lead up to the Brexit referendum 
(and afterwards). Jouissance entailed the invocation of Britain’s glorious past as a 
global power, militarily and economically, whilst creating chains of signification 
to Britain’s fights against Nazism, communism and the 1982 Falklands War. Brexit 
enabled a sense of national rejoice, at least for some, whilst emerging more recently 
in the UK election of 2019 as a promise that has been betrayed by Parliament, and 
the establishment. Loss directly links to fantasy and jouissance since it is produced 
through the fantasmatic narrative of Brexit, namely Britain’s sense of loss—of 
power, of influence and of importance—that is then produced as the cause of the 
Brexit desire to close that gap, to recapture national jouissance.
In short, all three apparatuses—fantasy, jouissance and loss—are intertwined 
such that at the formal-structural level we could say that the national-populism edi-
fice operates affectively through its promise of wholeness, greatness and the recoup-
ing of national grandeur and thus jouissance. The promise of belonging to the peo-
ple/nation versus those who stole it from us obscures the lack, the unease and indeed 
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anxiety. Now, because such wholeness, such stasis is unattainable and as the dis-
course centres around empty tautological chains of signification, the national-pop-
ulism subjectivity is made and hailed. The desire to attain the Lacanian objet petit a 
is bound to fail but the drive which sits on this endless movement, gets its enjoyment 
in perpetuum mobile.
This further demonstrates the ambiguity of the ‘nation’ and ‘people’ signi-
fiers which, I argue, endow them with such strong affective power, of hailing the 
national-populist subjectivity by promising closure. It also shows how in such cases 
we cannot easily sperate between horizontal and vertical demands, between nation-
alism and populism, respectively. The Brexit discourse clearly articulates the Other 
as both inside (the immigrant) and outside (the EU ‘super-state’). The source of 
authority for the Brexit call to ‘stand tall’ and ‘take back control’ had been the peo-
ple as the common/ordinary people, and the people as the sovereign nation.
We should, moreover, be critical of these calls to regain Britain’s grandeur, to 
reclaim British sovereignty and to reassert British control (over spending, over 
borders, over immigration etc.). This is because such calls are not innocent. They 
always entail an Other, a someone/something to blame for why Britain lost its 
national enjoyment and power and how once this Other is removed Britain will be 
great again. This is the typical process of Othering in which a perceived obstacle 
is identified and named, and which seems to encapsulate all that is wrong in our 
society [7, 38]. It is the Other that prevents ‘us’ from recouping ‘our’ lost enjoy-
ment and celebrate ‘our’ national grandeur. It is the Other who steals ‘our’ jobs and 
exploits ‘our’ benefit system. For now, it is Brussels who ‘stole our democracy’ or 
increased immigration which is ‘… driving our housing policy, NHS demand and 
school places’. This Othering, however, will not go away now given the UK has yet 
to leave the EU, entering into an unpredictable ‘transition period’. Since the socio-
economic prospects for the UK are far from favourable, it remains to be seen how 
the Brexit fantasy will unfold and who will the Brexiteers blame?
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